

# THE SOCIAL CREDITER

## FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REALISM

Vol. 60 No. 2

MARCH–APRIL, 1981

### Prophecy In The Twentieth Century

#### I. Arnold Toynbee (Royal Institute of International Affairs).

Arnold Toynbee underwent a classical education at Balliol College, Oxford, and subsequently became a tutor and fellow in classical history at the College. In 1915 he began working for the intelligence department of the British Foreign Office. In 1919, aged 30, he was appointed a delegate to the Paris Peace Conference which formulated the Versailles Treaty that in retrospect can be seen to have prepared the way for the resumption of war – World War II. The Conference also gave birth to the League of Nations, to be succeeded by the United Nations Organisation – the foetal form of the projected One World Government.

In 1925 Toynbee became research professor of international history at the London School of Economics, and director of studies at the Royal Institute of International Affairs. He was director of foreign research at the R.I.A. 1939-43, and research director of the Foreign Office 1943-46. He retained his position at the L.S.E. until retirement in 1956.

In an address delivered in London and subsequently published in *The New Age*, January 24, 1932 C.H. Douglas quoted some extracts from the article here re-printed in full from *International Affairs* (organ of the Royal Institute of International Affairs), November, 1931. If the article was noticed at all elsewhere, it was apparently not widely noticed or commented on; yet there could hardly be a more explicit statement of intent in the literature relating to long-term conspiracy as a main-spring in history. The constant use of the pronoun “we” in relation to events past, future and contemporary is virtually conclusive evidence of a long-term plan. Those of our readers who have studied *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, commonly denounced as a “forgery”, will recognise the similarity of theme in Toynbee’s address. In particular, Toynbee’s statement that “we did not bring the New World into being to redress but to upset the balance of the Old” points directly to the contemporary collapse of distinctively European cultures submerged in the European Economic Community, and the dissolution of the British Empire and the contemporary destruction of Britain itself. And Toynbee’s final ‘suggestion’ relating to the Institute of Pacific Relations relates directly to the Communist conquest of China and the disasters of the Korean and Viet Nam wars. (See J.A. Stormer’s *None Dare Call It Treason*, pp. 31 ff.) “They care no more for the immolation of the peoples of a continent than for the death of a sparrow.” (C.H. Douglas: *The Development of World Dominion*.)

For an overall view of developments since the end of World War I, see *The Social Crediter*, Nov.–Dec. 1978: “A Social Credit Perspective”.

#### THE TREND OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS SINCE THE WAR\*

By ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE

When we try to survey the course of international affairs during the twelve years and more that have elapsed since the Armistice of 1918 we are apt to be bewildered at first sight by the multitude and complexity of the tendencies which we perceive. Yet, on reflection, we may find ourselves able to gather up the manifold tendencies in a single formula. The formula which I would suggest for your consideration is this: In the “post-War” period the principal tendency in international affairs has been the tendency of all human affairs to become international.

Expressed in these bald terms, my formula perhaps strikes you as an exaggeration. Let me put it to the test by very briefly considering the facts. And let us distinguish between one set of facts and another. Let us take our stand first on the economic plane, then on the political, and then on the cultural, and examine in succession the facts that present themselves to our vision on each of these horizons.

I start from the economic plane because here my formula is a truism. On the economic plane, the tendency for all affairs to become international affairs has not declared itself since the Armistice for the first time. It was well established long before the War. It goes back to the Industrial Revolution, which made the whole world a market for our Western manufactures. And it goes even further back than that, to the voyages of discovery which turned all the navigable seas on the face of the planet into highways for our Western carrying-trade. Really, the present economic unification of the world was implicit in the first circumnavigation of the globe, more than four centuries ago, by Western navigators.

But this process of unification has proceeded at a very different pace on our three different planes of social activity. Consider the situation at the outbreak of war in 1914. At that moment, when the economic unification of the world was well within sight, its political unification had not yet begun. Economically, the world in 1914 was

\*This paper was read at the Fourth annual Conference of Institutions for the Scientific Study of International Relations, held at Copenhagen on June 8th–10th, 1931. The purpose of these Conferences, which were initiated by the League of Nations Institute for Intellectual Cooperation, is to facilitate cooperation between institutions for the study and teaching of international affairs in different countries. Twelve countries were represented at the Copenhagen Conference, and in addition delegates attended from four international organisations. To provide a link between the various national institutions and their counterparts in other countries, and also to arrange for representation at the Annual Conferences and the execution of the resolutions passed, National Coordinating Committees have been and are being formed. The National Coordinating Committee in Great Britain is domiciled at the Royal Institute of International Affairs and consists of representatives from that Institute, from the London School of Economics and Political Science, the Woodrow Wilson Chair of International Politics at Aberystwyth, and the Montagu Burton Chair of International Relations at Oxford.

already displaying the lineaments of a single great cooperative society. Politically, the world of 1914 was still in that state of anarchy into which Western Christendom had fallen at the end of the Middle Ages, after the politico-religious unity which had been created and maintained by the mediæval Western Church had broken down. During the intervening four or five centuries, practically nothing had been done to fill the fearful void which the breakup of mediæval Western Christendom had left behind. And the situation had become much more serious, because the area of the anarchy had spread. The Western Christendom which broke up into a cluster of local sovereign independent states at the close of the Middle Ages occupied only an insignificant portion of the earth's surface and contained only an insignificant fraction of the living generation of mankind. If Western Christendom had been wiped off the map—or had wiped itself off the map by internecine warfare—in the year 1414 or in the year 1514 of the Christian era, civilisation could have survived and human progress could have continued. But this could no longer be said in 1914. During the intervening four centuries, the economic system of Western Christendom had spread all over the world; and our Western political anarchy had spread with it—supplanting all the other political anarchies and political orders which had been produced by other societies. The wars which our Western anarchy had provoked in its earlier stages had been confined, in their effects, to Western Europe. The War of 1914–18 was a world-war, which left no people or country, in any continent, entirely unaffected.

On the cultural plane, again, in 1914, the unification which was already an accomplished fact on the economic plane was still in embryo. By 1914 the Oriental had become implicated in our Western society in his economic activities. He had become accustomed to sell his raw cotton to the Western manufacturer and to buy the Western manufacturer's cotton cloth. But this economic intercourse seemed to have had singularly little effect upon the life of the spirit. Out of every million Hindus or Chinese who were then exchanging goods and services with the peoples of the West, you could almost count on your fingers the number who had also begun to exchange emotions and perceptions and ideas—who had established an intercourse with Western civilisation in the spiritual domains of religion and art and thought. Economically, the Hindu or the Chinese peasant might have become a cog in the great world-compelling Western economic machine. Culturally, he apparently remained as much of an Oriental and as little of a Westerner as ever. Even the Japanese, who had learnt to spin and weave his own cotton and to build his own battleships, was reported by competent Western observers to have retained almost intact his Japanese soul.

This, then, in a general way, was the situation on the eve of the War. The unification of the world had made remarkable progress on the economic plane, whereas on the political and cultural planes it had scarcely begun. The great new development since the War, as I see it, has been this: the tendency towards world-unity has not only persisted in the economic life of mankind, but it has also asserted itself—rather suddenly and very powerfully—in our political and cultural life as well. An observer from another planet, making a survey of human affairs on this planet before the War, must have been struck by the contrast between the tendency towards worldwide cooperation which was in the ascendant in our economic life and the strangely different conditions which then prevailed on the other two planes of human activity: the political anarchy in the relations between States and the spiritual isolation from one another of the heirs to the several great historic cultures which divided the spiritual allegiance of the civilised majority of the human race. This contrast pointed to a social disharmony which went to the root of our international troubles and which was one of the deeper causes of the World War itself. In the perspective of the past twelve years, we can now see that, since the restoration of peace, this dangerous discrepancy has begun to be attenuated and toned down.

It is as though people had begun to realise, half-consciously, that mankind could not permanently lead a double life: a new-fangled international life on the economic plane and an antiquated parochial life on the political and cultural planes. Either our modern economic internationalism has to be sacrificed, or else we must learn to live our political and our cultural life on the modern world-wide scale, which we have achieved in our economic life already. Sacrifice our modern economic internationalism! Why, that would mean abandoning the industrial system, scrapping machinery and falling back to the economic level of the Middle Ages! As soon as we face that alternative, we realise that the destruction of life, wealth and happiness which it would entail would be stupendous. If this disaster were to overtake us, it would be by far the greatest calamity on record in human history. No human being in his senses could dream of submitting to it deliberately. Any human being who has once become even dimly aware of the choice before us is bound to make some exertion in order to avert this alternative by bringing the other alternative to pass. The other alternative, of course, is that we should bring our political and our cultural life into harmony with our economic life; that we should preserve our economic internationalism by internationalising our social life through and through, in all its layers. It seems as though, since the restoration of peace, people are becoming aware that this thorough-going internationalism is the only alternative to the breakdown of modern civilisation. A determined effort to internationalise our political and cultural life, as we have already internationalised our economic life, is surely the keynote of this "post-War" age—a key-note which rings out so clear that it is unmistakable, short though the period of its dominance has been so far.

Let us examine this "post-War" internationalism, first in the field of politics and then in the field of culture.

In the field of politics the strength of our effort, since the Armistice, to substitute internationalism for nationalism, worldwide organisation for parochialism, order for anarchy, is surely impressive. Without over-estimating our achievement up to date, or under-estimating the amount, or the difficulty, of what still remains to be done, I think we can fairly say that, in these last dozen years, we have made more progress towards overcoming the anarchy in the relations between States than our predecessors made during the previous four centuries. The Covenant of the League of Nations, the Multilateral Treaty of Paris for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, the General Act of Arbitration and Conciliation, the Protocol for Financial Assistance to States Victims of Aggression, and the World Disarmament Conference which is to begin its work eight months hence—these are achievements which would have astonished an older generation. Indeed, they would have astonished us ourselves in the state of mind in which we grew up before the War. If such projects had been foreshadowed to us in our "pre-War" existence, we should have dismissed them, without hesitation, as fantastic suggestions which were quite incapable of being realised in practical politics.

So much for our successes; but I dare say you will agree with me in finding even more impressive evidence in our determination in our obstinate refusal to be discouraged by our failures. Since our statesmen have had the greater courage not to despair of these failures, we scholars and publicists can assuredly summon up the lesser courage required in order to recall how serious some of these failures and set-backs have been. The refusal of the Senate at Washington to ratify the Covenant of the League; the equally emphatic rebuff which has been given to the League, since the outset, by the Soviet Government; the abortive Treaty of Mutual Assistance; the abortive Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes; the failure to bring about the admission of Germany to membership in the League of Nations in March 1926; the failure of the Three-Power Geneva Naval Conference between

the British Empire, Japan and the United States in 1927; the failure of France and Italy to come into line with one another and with the three oceanic Naval Powers during the London Naval Conference of 1930; the dangerous situation which arose during the concluding session of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference last autumn—here is a list of failures as striking as the list of successes which I recited just now. In ordinary circumstances—or (shall I say?) in “pre-War” circumstances—any one of those failures might have been enough to make the statesmen and the peoples of the world abandon in weariness or disgust or despair this great enterprise of establishing a political world-order. The point—and it is a very encouraging point—to which I want to draw your attention is that we, in our generation, have not allowed any of these failures to daunt us. In every one of these cases we have persisted in our endeavours until we have achieved in the end what we failed to achieve at the first or the second attempt; or else we have found some way of circumventing the obstacle which we were unable to surmount.

To take the most recent example, the troubles which arose during the concluding session of the Preparatory Commission have not deterred us from fixing a date for the World Disarmament Conference. I confidently believe that, if the first World Disarmament Conference does not achieve its purpose, we shall call a second, and that, if the second does not succeed, we shall call a third. I believe that we shall persist until we have solved not only the special problem of national armaments but the general problem of international anarchy, of which armaments are a symptom. My confidence is founded on my observation of the spirit in which we are grappling with our tremendous political task. You remember, perhaps, that one of the most famous generals in history once remarked that his opponents were invincible because they never knew when they were beaten. It is my hope that this same kind of invincible ignorance—a really heroic form of ignorance—may carry our generation to victory in our spiritual war for the establishment of universal and enduring peace.

In the spirit of determination which happily animates us, we shall have no inclination to under-estimate the strength of the political force which we are striving to overcome. What is this force? If we are frank with ourselves, we shall admit that we are engaged on a deliberate and sustained and concentrated effort to impose limitations upon the sovereignty and the independence of the fifty or sixty local sovereign independent States which at present partition the habitable surface of the earth and divide the political allegiance of mankind. The surest sign, to my mind, that this fetish of local national sovereignty is our intended victim is the emphasis with which all our statesmen and our publicists protest with one accord, and over and over again, at every step forward which we take, that, whatever changes we may make in the international situation, the sacred principle of local sovereignty will be maintained inviolable. This I repeat, is a sure sign that, at each of those steps forward, the principle of local sovereignty is really being encroached upon & its sphere of action reduced & its power for evil restricted. It is just because we are really attacking the principle of local sovereignty that we keep on protesting our loyalty to it so loudly. The harder we press our attack upon the idol, the more pains we take to keep its priests and devotees in a fool's paradise—lapped in a false sense of security which will inhibit them from taking up arms in their idol's defence. Perhaps, too, when we make these protestations, we are partly concerned to deceive ourselves. For let us be honest. Even the most internationally-minded among us are votaries of this false god of local national sovereignty to some extent. It is such an old-established object of worship that it retains some hold even over the most enlightened souls.

And what is the magic which gives local sovereignty its power? It is powerful, I think, because it has inherited the prestige and the prerogatives of the mediæval Western Church, which were transferred, at the close of the Middle Ages, from the whole to the parts

from the great society of Western Christendom to each of that society's “successor states,” represented now by the fifty or sixty sovereign independent States of the “post-War” world. The local national state, invested with the attributes of sovereignty—invested, that is, with the prestige and the prerogatives of the mediæval Church—is an abomination of desolation standing in the place where it ought not. It has stood in that place now—demanding and receiving human sacrifices from its poor deluded votaries—for four or five centuries. Our political task in our generation is to cast the abomination out, to cleanse the temple and to restore the worship of the divinity to whom the temple rightfully belongs. In plain terms, we have to re-transfer the prestige and the prerogatives of sovereignty from the fifty or sixty fragments of contemporary society to the whole of contemporary society—from the local national states by which sovereignty has been usurped, with disastrous consequences, for half a millennium, to some institution embodying our society as a whole.

In the world as it is to-day, this institution can hardly be a universal Church. It is more likely to be something like a League of Nations. I will not prophesy. I will merely repeat that we are at present working, discreetly but with all our might, to wrest this mysterious political force called sovereignty out of the clutches of the local national states of our world. And all the time we are denying with our lips what we are doing with our hands, because to impugn the sovereignty of the local national states of the world is still a heresy for which a statesman or a publicist can be—perhaps not quite burnt at the stake, but certainly ostracised and discredited. The dragon of local sovereignty can still use its teeth and claws when it is brought to bay. Nevertheless, I believe that the monster is doomed to perish by our sword. The fifty or sixty local states of the world will no doubt survive as administrative conveniences. But sooner or later sovereignty will depart from them. Sovereignty will cease, in fact if not in name, to be a local affair.

To pious nationalists this prophecy will seem either ridiculous or blasphemous. Whether or not it is ridiculous, only time can show. As for its being blasphemous from the nationalistic point of view, I should like to make this observation: if the fifty or sixty now sovereign States of the world reconcile themselves to the surrender of their sovereignty in good time, they can look forward to preserving their existence as non-sovereign institutions for an indefinite time to come, perhaps even in perpetuity. And this is a thought in which the votaries of these idols—the pious nationalists—may find some consolation. For a local state may lose its sovereignty without losing those familiar features which endear it to the local patriot—such features, I mean, as the local vernacular language and folk-lore and costume, and the local monuments of the historic past. So long as the local state is not stripped of these harmless trappings, it will remain almost as effective an idol as ever, and its worshippers are likely to find almost as much satisfaction in carrying on their cult with bloodless sacrifices as they find to-day when their idol demands from them the sacrifice of their children's lives in the ritual of war. Here, then, is some consolation for local patriots in the event of sovereignty being transferred, by a voluntary and peaceable process, from local states to some organ representing human society as a whole. And there is also satisfaction here for those of us who—without sharing the local patriot's passion for local sovereignty—appreciate, at least as deeply as he does, the value for mankind of an abiding diversity of national cultures.

But supposing that this does not happen? Supposing that the present generation of mankind is defeated in the end, after all, in the strenuous effort which we are making to centralise the force of sovereignty and to reduce our international anarchy to order—in that event, what is the outlook which confronts us? Will the defeat of internationalism—if our cause is to be defeated—enable a rampant nationalism to go on running riot in the world for ever? If our fanatical nationalists believe that, they are tragically mistaken. Their mistake is written large, for those who have eyes to see, in the

histories of other civilisations than ours—civilisations which have already run their course and passed out of existence so that the whole of their story, from beginning to end, lies unfolded for us to read and take to heart.

When we study history we perceive that the political problem with which we are grappling, in our generation of our society, is by no means unprecedented. The curse of political anarchy, which comes from the distribution of sovereignty among a plurality of local states, has afflicted other societies before ours; but, in all these other cases in which the same situation has arisen, it has always been transitory. For anarchy, by its very nature, cures itself, sooner or later, by one means or another. The cure may come through a voluntary, pacific, rational constructive effort, such as we are making in our day—an effort to deprive the local states of their sovereignty for the benefit of society as a whole, without at the same time depriving them of their existence. Alternatively the cure may come through a blind, violent, irrational and destructive clash of material forces. Refusing to surrender their sovereignty, the local states may continue to collide with one another in war after war, until this political struggle for existence is terminated at length by a “knock-out blow.” On this alternative, all the local sovereign states except one are doomed eventually to forfeit not only their sovereignty but their very existence; for, on this alternative, the anarchy will be ended not by agreement but by force; not by the organisation of a pacific League of Nations but by the imposition of a universal empire through the victory of one militant nation over all the rest.

I should like to point out that, hitherto, this has been the normal way in which international anarchy has been brought to an end. In the ancient world in the West the incessant conflicts between the local sovereign states round the Mediterranean were brought to an end at last by the definitive victory of Rome—a victory which resulted in the elimination of every other state, to make way for the Roman Empire. And if we turn our eyes to the other side of Asia and trace the Chinese Empire back to its origins, we shall find that it likewise arose out of incessant conflicts between a multitude of local sovereign states—arose, that is, by the same process which generated the Roman Empire in our part of the world. Well, there, in these examples drawn from history, we see the fatal alternative which we, in our society and in our day, are striving to avoid. Shall we cure our international anarchy by voluntary organisation, or shall we leave it to cure itself by the blind operation of force? Shall we cure it now, while our social vitality is still strong, or shall we leave it to cure itself by a process of exhaustion? That, I believe, is the great issue which confronts us, in our time, on the political plane of international affairs. I do not believe that any other choice is open to us. In particular, I do not believe that, either by taking thought or by *laissez faire*, we can secure the continuation of the peculiar conditions of the last two or three centuries, during which sovereignty has been dispersed among a number of independent political entities.

And now let us shift our standpoint from the political to the cultural plane and look at what has been happening, during these “post-War” years, in a field of social activity which is nearer the heart of life, and therefore more important and more interesting, than either politics or economics. In the field of culture, as in the field of politics, I believe that a deliberate and determined effort towards internationalism is the key-note of our “post-War” age.

Before the War, the non-Western peoples of the world were either refusing to adopt Western culture at all, or else they were adopting it unwillingly and only to the least extent required by considerations of sheer self-preservation. The one element in Western culture which Oriental peoples could not afford to reject was the Western art of war; and if we examine the work of the great pioneers of Westernisation in Oriental countries before 1914, we shall find that this was invariably their point of departure. Study the work of Peter the Great in Russia, of Mahmud II. in Turkey, of Mehmed Ali in Egypt, of the Elder Statesmen in Japan: you will find that the stimulus

which stirred them all to action was the discovery that their peoples were incapable of holding their own in war against the Western peoples of their day; and you will likewise find that the objective which they all set themselves was to create new-model armies and navies, armed and trained and organised in the Western way, which would be capable of meeting Western armies and navies in battle on equal terms. No doubt, in pursuing this objective, the pre-War Westernisers were led much further along the slippery path of Westernisation than they had expected or intended. For civilisations are coherent wholes; and, if once you decide to adopt one element in an alien civilisation, you are apt to be drawn, step by step, into adopting many others. To take the case in point, it is hardly possible for a non-Western people to practise the Western art of war efficiently without adopting in some measure the Western economic technique and the Western method of administration and the Western system of education. And when once you open the door of education, it is practically impossible to censor the ideas that stream in. Sultan Abd-al-Hamid tried to prevent the entry of Western literature into the Ottoman Empire; but he dared not cripple the efficiency of his military cadets by forbidding them to learn French and English and German. Without a mastery of these languages they could not have kept abreast with the advance of Western military science in peace-time, or have served as intelligence officers in time of war. But a knowledge of Western languages opened the door to an acquisition of Western political ideas; and it was the young officers trained in Abd-al-Hamid’s military academy who deprived the Sultan of his autocratic powers in 1908 in the name of the principles of the French Revolution. This example shows what far-reaching consequences the adoption of some single element in an alien culture may eventually entail. But it also illustrates my point that on the whole, before 1914, the pioneers of Westernisation in Oriental countries were playing their part unwillingly; that they were anxious to do the minimum; that they were aiming at the single practical and concrete objective of acquiring the Western art of war; and that any ulterior consequences which this limited aim proved to entail were not merely unexpected but were highly unwelcome to the very potentates who had initiated these innovations.

What a contrast in aim and outlook and temper between these “pre-War” Westernisers and their successors in our “post-War” days: the Mustafa Kemals and the Sun Yat-sens! Before the War, Turkey and China were conspicuous for their conservatism even among Oriental countries; by comparison, for example, with Russia or Egypt or Japan or Siam. During several generations in succession, the Turks and the Chinese suffered themselves to be dragged along the path of Westernisation step by step—painfully and ignominiously and disastrously. They never voluntarily took a step which was not forced upon them; they never anticipated a step which it was by any means possible for them to postpone. And now, suddenly, they have had what one can only call a psychological conversion—a change of heart of a kind with which we are more familiar in the realm of religious experience. After being dragged into the water knee-deep, they have taken the plunge and have dived in head-over-ears. They have been seized by a furor of iconoclasm which makes the famous revolutions in our Western history seem tame by comparison. We Westerners have taken our revolutions one by one, like a walker who keeps one foot on the ground while he lifts the other a step forward. These “post-War” Westernisers in the East have taken all their revolutions at once, like a man who leaps from the top of a cliff with both feet together.

Try to imagine, in our Western history, that the intellectual renaissance and the religious reformation and the political revolutions which have substituted parliamentary government for autocracy, and the voyages of discovery and the industrial revolution which have transformed our economic life, had all been crowded into a single generation—our own generation—instead of being strung out

over the course of more than four centuries. If you can imagine that (and it is not at all easy for us to imagine), then you will have some idea of the *tempo* of cultural change in Turkey or in China to-day. It is a *tempo* which we comparatively conservative and slow-moving Westerners can hardly conceive; and, if we could conceive it, our heads would swim at the mere thought. Think of what has been happening in Turkey since the restoration of peace: the establishment of the Republic; the abolition of the Caliphate; the laicisation of the state; the substitution of the Latin for the Arabic alphabet; the emancipation of women. And think of what has been happening in China: the abolition of the examinations in the Confucian Classics for admission to the Civil Service; the abandonment of the Confucian ethics as the standard for social conduct. These two acts of iconoclasm in China amount to a radical breach with the past in the two spheres of intellectual and moral culture. Apparently the Turks and the Chinese have come to the conclusion that the world of the future is destined to be unified on a Western basis, not only on the superficial economic plane but right down to the deeper levels of social life. And, in a world which is travelling in this direction, they have determined not to remain "peculiar peoples." They have made up their minds to westernise their lives from top to bottom. Whether they will succeed or fail, who, at this stage, will venture to prophesy? This enterprise of cultural internationalism is obviously very much more difficult than the enterprise of political internationalism on which mankind, in our generation, is engaged simultaneously. We can observe, however, that our "post-War" Westernisers, in addressing themselves to their task of breaking down the barriers which have hitherto isolated the historic cultures from one another, are displaying the same spirit of energy and determination that is animating our statesmen and publicists in their effort to substitute some kind of political order for our political anarchy.

So much for the deliberate Westernisers—the Sun Yat-sens and the Mustafa Kemals. But I wish also to draw your attention to the impetus which has been given involuntarily to this same process of Westernisation by the Gandhis and the Lenins—prophets who are up in arms against the West and who have found their mission in denouncing Western civilisation and all its works.

What a strange irony there is in Lenin's career! Here is a prophet, great enough to gather up, in his own personality, the whole reaction of the Russian soul against Western civilisation—a reaction which had been gaining momentum during the two centuries that had passed since the ordeal of Westernisation was first forced upon Russia by Peter the Great. And when Lenin casts about for a creed to express this spiritual revolt, does he find a creed of Russian origin? No, he is constrained to arm Russia for her fight against the West with a borrowed Western weapon. His indictment of Western civilisation is taken at second-hand from a Western critic: Karl Marx. It is true that, in the Russian atmosphere, the Marxian social philosophy appears to be undergoing a metamorphosis. It appears to be turning with amazing rapidity into a substitute for Orthodox Christianity with Marx for Moses and Lenin for the Messiah, and their collected works for the scriptures of this new Russian Church Militant. In this curious metamorphosis of Marxism it looks, for a moment, as though in Russia the spirit of Western civilisation had been overcome and the indigenous spirit of Byzantine civilisation had reasserted itself. But it does not look like that when we turn our attention from faith to works, and examine what Lenin and his successors are actually doing to the Russian people.

What is the significance of the Five-Year Plan? Whether it be destined to succeed or to fail, there can be no mistake about its intention. It is an attempt to mechanise agriculture as well as industry and transportation, to change a nation of peasants into a nation of mechanics, to transform the old Russia into a new America. In other words, it is an attempt at Westernisation so ambitious, so radical, so ruthless, that it puts Peter the Great's work into the shade. If Peter could have had foreknowledge of it he would have gasped. "I only chastised my miserable Russians with whips," he

would have exclaimed, "but my successors are chastising them with scorpions! I only scratched the surface of Russian life, but my successors are ploughing up the soil and pulling up the tree of indigenous Russian culture by the roots!" Thus, willy-nilly, Lenin and his successors are working, with demoniac energy, to ensure the triumph in Russia of the very civilisation which they are denouncing in the world at large. No doubt they dream of creating a society which will be American in equipment but Communist in soul. Strange dream to be dreamed by statesmen for whom the materialistic, deterministic interpretation of history is an article of faith! Can any good Marxian really maintain that, if a Russian peasant is taught to do the work and live the life of an American mechanic, this Russian peasant will not likewise learn to think as the American mechanic thinks and to feel as he feels and to desire what he desires? In this tug-of-war, in Russia, between the ideals of Lenin and the methods of Ford, I suspect that Americanism is destined to be the victor; and, if I happened to be a Marxian myself, my suspicion would harden into a dogmatic certainty.

And is there not the same irony in the career of Gandhi? The Hindu prophet sets out to sever the threads of cotton which have entangled India in the activities of the Western world. "Spin and weave our Indian cotton," he preaches, "with your Indian hands. Do not any longer clothe yourselves in the products of Western power-looms; and do not, I conjure you, seek to drive those alien products out of the Indian market by setting up on Indian soil new Indian power-looms on the Western pattern!" This message, which is Gandhi's real message, is not accepted by Gandhi's countrymen. They revere the spirit of the saint, but they only follow his guidance in so far as he resigns himself to leading them along the path of Westernisation. And thus we see Gandhi to-day promoting a political movement with a Western programme—the transformation of India into a sovereign independent parliamentary state—and with a Western procedure (the whole Western political apparatus of conferences, resolutions, votes, platforms, newspapers and publicity). In this political campaign, the prophet's most effective—though not his most obtrusive—supporters are those very Indian industrialists who have done the most to defeat the prophet's real mission—the men who have acclimatised the technique of Western industrialism in India itself. Their factory chimneys, which the prophet, in his heart of hearts, must regard with dismay, rise almost within view of his retreat at Sabarmati. Stranger still, Western thoughts colour and inform the prophet's own mind. He seeks inspiration in Western works of philosophy and devotion at least as much as in the Hindu scriptures.

Surely a Gandhi and a Lenin testify, by their careers, to the strength of the movement towards cultural internationalism in our time, even more eloquently than a Mustafa Kemal or a Sun Yat-sen.

I come back now to my main thesis: that a tendency for all affairs to become international is the principal tendency in international affairs in this "post-War" age. While I have taken my thesis for granted in the economic sphere, I hope I have succeeded in supporting it, in the political and cultural spheres, by the evidence which I have brought forward (evidence which, of course, can only be illustrative and not demonstrative within the limits of time at my disposal). I suggest, then, that in our generation the social life of mankind is becoming internationalised through and through; and, on every plane of activity, this new internationalism is Western in its structure and in its complexion. Just as the world-wide economic system which has already virtually established itself is Western in its technique, so the world-wide political order and the cosmopolitan culture which we, in our generation, are seeking to create are both being fashioned out of materials of Western origin. The new international society, if it comes to maturity, will be an outgrowth of Western civilisation, a tree whose branches overshadow the whole earth but whose stem springs from European roots.

And here, in passing, I would call your attention to the strange and paradoxical position in which Europe finds herself in our "post-

War". world. Europe—or, perhaps more accurately, Western and Central Europe—is the garden in which this new, world-wide, all-embracing, cosmopolitan civilisation has been nurtured. Instead of saying that the civilisation of the whole world has been coalescing into a single unity, one might say with equal accuracy that European civilisation has expanded until now, to-day, the whole world lies at its feet. After four centuries of this triumphal progress we should naturally expect Europe, the region from which this conquering civilisation has been propagated, to find herself mistress of the other continents. Far from that, we actually see Europe dwarfed and put out of countenance by the outer world which she has succeeded in bringing within her ambit. To invert a famous phrase, we Europeans have called a new world into being not to *redress* but to *upset* the balance of the old.

In the new world-wide society which has grown out of our old European society, the countries of Europe are now encircled by a ring of outlying countries—either colonised by European emigrants or overrun by European conquerors or opened up by European traders, but all alike brought within our ambit in one way or another—which completely dwarf our largest European countries in material scale as measured by the factors of area and population and wealth and efficiency. The United States, which has been the first of these giants to grow to full stature, is already a match, not for this or that European state or group of states, but for Europe as a whole. How will Europe look, and how shall we Europeans feel, when Canada and Argentina and Australia have peopled their empty spaces, and when Russia and India and China and Brazil have learnt the trick of efficiency, and when the Union of South Africa has expanded its territory from the Tropic of Capricorn to the Equator? When that day comes, the pygmy countries of Western Europe will be confronted not by one giant but by a dozen of them. The political supremacy and the economic control in the new international society will then have passed irrevocably from Europe to the outer world. Europe will have lost the kingdom and the power, but what about the glory? What about her cultural leadership, which accounts, in the last resort, far more than her transient political kingdom or her out-classed economic power, for the extraordinary mark which she has made already upon the history of the world?

If the cultural leadership—the divine gift of creative genius—were destined to pass from Europe at the same time as her political and economic ascendancy, then a philosophic observer of international affairs, even if he happened to be a European himself, might look forward to the decline and fall of Europe with resignation or even with equanimity. He might console himself by reflecting that a creator may die in the flesh yet achieve immortality through his creations. If Europe had really called into being a world-wide civilisation which could go on living and growing without her, then she could exclaim like Simeon, *Nunc dimittis*, and like Horace, *Non omnis moriar*, and like the writer of Wren's epitaph, *Si monumentum requiris circumspice*. Now we can already imagine a situation, and this in a future that is not altogether remote, in which the economic and political contribution of Europe to the life of mankind would have dwindled to a point at which it could be dispensed with without irreparable damage to the general well-being of the world. In other words, we can imagine a future state of our world-society in which Europe would have become economically and politically superfluous. The crucial question is whether we can foresee a situation in which Europe's cultural contribution to the life of mankind will have become superfluous likewise. Being a European myself, I am conscious that, in attempting to answer this question, I may not be free from prejudice. Yet, after making all the allowance that I can for my own personal prepossessions, I still find myself answering this crucial question with an emphatic negative. However far I project my mind into the future, I cannot foresee a time when the outer world will be able to dispense with European culture—with the thought and the art and the ideals which radiate out from Europe over the

rest of the world. If this light that shines in Europe were to be extinguished, the rest of the world would surely sink first into twilight and ultimately into darkness. If this salt that is preserved in Europe were to lose its savour, the rest of the world would surely find itself going intellectually and aesthetically stale. Therefore we must exert ourselves to safeguard the position of Europe in the new international society—and this not only in the interests of us poor Europeans, but in the interests of mankind at large.

The dwarfing of Europe, then, is certainly a tendency in the international development of the "post-War" world which demands our attention. There is one more "post-War" tendency which I should like to touch upon before I conclude. I suggest to you that public and private affairs are much less sharply marked off from one another now than they were before.

Before the War it would be broadly true to say that international relations on the political plane were the monopoly of governments, while international relations on the economic and cultural planes were abandoned by governments to private enterprise. To-day, neither of these propositions would be even approximately accurate.

The tendency for governments to intervene, more and more actively, in economic and cultural affairs is conspicuous. It is not only that governments have been more assiduous, since the Armistice, in economic and cultural activities in which they were already interested before the War (such economic activities, I mean, as tariff and migration restrictions and gold-hoarding and the "pegging" of exchanges, and such cultural activities as education). It is more significant that governments have been entering upon activities which they hardly touched at all before. I am thinking particularly of state trading; and the trade monopoly of the Soviet Government is naturally the instance that occurs first to one's mind. An exceptional case, you say? With all deference, I beg leave to disagree. The Communist Government of Russia is merely doing, thoroughly and with conviction, in peace-time, what the capitalist governments of the Western countries did, piece-meal and half-heartedly, during the War. An exceptional case, you say, once again? What was done under the stress of war has no bearing upon what is likely to be the general practice under normal conditions? But suppose that abnormal conditions prevail again and go on prevailing for an indefinite period. Suppose, for example, that the present world-wide economic depression does not cure itself automatically. I suggest to you that, in that event, what was the temporary practice of the West during the War and is the local practice of Russia to-day may become the regular practice of the world the day after to-morrow.

And here I should like to say a word about the positive functions which will be performed by our local national states if we succeed in our present endeavour to transfer political sovereignty to some institution representing society as a whole. Hitherto, the local national state has been a political institution first and foremost. Is it not conceivable that, in the new order which we are striving to bring into being, the political functions of the local national state may dwindle almost to vanishing point, while in compensation its economic and cultural functions may expand to an extent that is yet undreamed of? If things go well with the world, I can imagine our local national states, which started their careers, in a rather sinister way, as killing-machines (killing by "War" outside the national frontiers, and by "Justice" inside them), ending up quite innocently as local associations for mutual benefit. I can imagine them developing, on the cultural side, into organisations for providing education, and on the economic side into cooperative societies of consumers. When political sovereignty has departed from the local capitals, the national ministries of education and public health and labour and commerce will overtop the ministries of defence and of external relations.

If you want confirmation of this prophecy, I recommend you to study the history of Prussia. For Prussia has always been a progressive state, as states go. During the last few centuries she has

been apt to be in advance of her neighbours. What Prussia has done one day, the other states of Europe have frequently done the day after. And I see no reason to suppose that this will not be so in the future as it has been in the past. When it was the main function of the state to be a war-machine, Prussia turned herself into an efficient war-machine some generations earlier than Austria or France. When education and health and unemployment insurance came within the state's purview, Prussia was again the pioneer. And now I will ask you to look carefully at the functions which the Prussian state is performing in our "post-War" period. The Prussian state has given up its sovereignty (voluntarily) since 1871; it has given up its army (under compulsion) since the end of the Great War. But Prussia has not ceased to be one of the great states of the modern world. She is still great because her public organisation of education and of the other social services is still second to none. I suggest to you that history is likely to repeat itself here, and that, once again, what Prussia is to-day, France and Great Britain and Italy, yes, and even the United States, are likely to become to-morrow. For the sake of the peace and prosperity of the world, I devoutly hope that my prophecy will prove correct!

If it is true that governments are tending to-day to extend their activities further and further into the economic and the cultural fields, it is also true that the field of international politics, which was regarded, before the War, as something mysterious and esoteric, has been entered, since the War, by private people. Here, at any rate, is a proposition which you will not ask me to demonstrate. It is proved, *a priori*, by the existence, in each of our countries, of private institutions for the scientific study of international relations and by the assemblage of the Fourth International Conference of such institutions here, in Copenhagen, where I have the privilege of addressing you to-day, thanks to the hospitality of our Danish hosts.

Why have private people taken a sudden interest in international politics since the War? Because the War showed us all, in a startling and a tragic way, that international politics are a matter of life and death to every man, woman and child in the world. This newly-awakened interest of private people, all over the world, in international politics is a healthy symptom and a reassuring symptom. Our national institutions exist, and our international conference meets, in order to serve the millions of private people who, directly or indirectly, are represented by the delegates assembled here in Copenhagen this week. We know what our function is. We exist in order to provide the private people of the world, who have become alive to the crucial importance of international politics, with the means for scientific study: to enable them to learn the facts of international politics with accuracy and to discuss the issues of international politics with the least amount of passion and prejudice and recrimination that is humanly possible. These are our great common permanent tasks; but if we are to perform them effectively, we must work on some plan.

I wonder whether you will agree with me if I suggest that this Conference, which is now meeting for the fourth time, might become a permanent instrument for cooperative study. Personally, I see possibilities of very effective coordination between the work which we can do on these occasions when we meet together, and the work which we are already doing, and shall continue to do, at home in our respective countries. This periodical meeting offers us opportunities for surveying, jointly, the common field of our studies from time to time and putting our finger on the particular point or points, within this vast field, upon which some scientific study seems to be called for. We can then perhaps go on to arrange among ourselves that the subjects which we single out for study shall be taken up by this or that national organisation, or by several national organisations together, or even by all of us concurrently. At subsequent meetings we can report progress, review results, and agree upon the next direction which we shall give to our work. In fact, as I see it, our international meetings and our national activities might well become

complementary to one another as two equally necessary components in a single cooperative plan.

This method has actually been pursued for some years now with notable success by the Institute of Pacific Relations. The I.P.R. differs from our organisation inasmuch as its scope is confined to one region of the world, albeit a very great and important region. By contrast, our organisation includes institutions from all parts of the world and has the whole world for its field of study. In this respect, I believe that we are better situated than the I.P.R., because I believe—and indeed this is the main thesis of my address—that the most important and interesting affairs of our time are world-wide in their range and transcend the limits of any one region, however large. It is not, however, in respect of geographical range but in respect of methods of study that I wish to suggest the I.P.R. as a precedent. The I.P.R. resembles our organisation in being an association of a number of private national organisations for the scientific study of international relations; and it does actually do its work in the way which I have suggested as a possible procedure for us: that is, by a combination of periodical international conferences with continuous work in the various national branches. If we do decide to use our Conference as an instrument for cooperative study, it might be useful for us to consider the method in which the I.P.R. has been experimenting since its foundation half-a-dozen years ago. Several of the national institutions represented here to-day are also affiliated to the I.P.R., and we are fortunate in having with us again in Copenhagen, as we had last year in Paris, a representative of the I.P.R. itself. I therefore hope that, in our discussion this morning, we may be able to refer to the experience of the I.P.R. for our guidance.

What are the problems to which the institutions represented at this Conference might address themselves cooperatively forthwith? In this assembly, that question is certain to evoke many answers. I expect to hear many suggestions put forward by those of my colleagues who speak after me, and I hope that this will be one of the main subjects of our discussion this morning. Therefore, if I venture, before sitting down, to make two suggestions for my own part, I do this merely to illustrate, by examples, the kind of cooperative studies that I have in mind. It is very likely that other more valuable and more practical suggestions will be placed before us by other delegates before we rise from this sitting.

The first of my two suggestions is for a permanent continuous study at long range. The second is for an *ad hoc* piece of work in view of the international situation of the moment. The two suggestions are entirely separate, and I would ask you to consider each on its own merits. As far as I can see, they do not stand or fall together.

My first suggestion is that we should set on foot some cooperative study of the position of Europe in the "post-War" world. Here the statesmen of Europe—and, first and foremost, one European statesman, Monsieur Briand—have led the way. But this is a field in which there is not only room for the statesmen and the publicists to work side by side, but in which there is also much to be gained by their doing so. There is no danger that we shall interfere with the statesmen's work, while there is some possibility that we may assist it in a modest way. But Monsieur Briand himself, you may remind me, has called into existence a committee for the study of this very problem. What is left for us to do? There is plenty for us to do, I reply; for just because we are not statesmen but private students, we shall study the same problem in a different way. Just because we have less power, less responsibility, less confidential information than the statesmen have, we enjoy greater freedom than they enjoy. It is the privilege, indeed the duty, of publicists to rush in where statesmen fear to tread. In our private studies we can handle with impunity those burning questions which the statesmen in conclave hardly dare to touch for fear of causing an international conflagration.

Moreover, we have the advantage over the statesmen in another way. The official committee which has been set up to deal with this problem is composed of the representatives of European states

exclusively. In the constitution of such a body, this limitation was perhaps inevitable; for an official committee is expected to do more than study: it is expected to take action, or at any rate to give the official advice on which action will be taken by the governments. On a body charged with these responsibilities, it would of course be a delicate matter to include the representatives of countries situated outside Europe. They could not be included without the danger of arousing European resentment at interference from outside and non-European misgivings at entanglement in European affairs. Yet, from the point of view of scientific study, it is surely impossible to handle this problem effectively in a body of exclusively European membership. It is impossible because the problem of Europe in the "post-War" world is not an exclusively European problem. If contemporary Europe were living *in vacuo*, the problem would not exist. It is essentially a question of the relation between Europe and the rest of the world. And for this reason I think that it is a problem which our association is admirably well fitted to study, because we have the advantage of including non-European as well as European institutions in our membership. I can assure our non-European colleagues that those of us who are European would regard their cooperation with us in such a study not only as valuable but as indispensable. And I will venture to take it for granted that our non-European colleagues are free from an illusion which one sometimes comes across among non-Europeans who have not made a serious study of international affairs. I refer, of course, to the illusion that the non-European world can safely leave Europe to cope with her own troubles. When the famous Protocol was being discussed at Geneva in 1924, a Canadian statesman observed that his countrymen lived in a fire-proof house, far from the conflagrations of Europe. With all respect, I suggest that this is not only an illusion but a dangerous illusion for all concerned. Surely our experience of the last European conflagration tells us plainly that, if Europe were to go up in flames once more, there would be no country in the world so distant, so isolated, or so well protected that it would survive unscathed.

My first suggestion, then, is that our association should undertake some cooperative study—with the full participation of our non-European members—of the position of Europe in the "post-War" world.

My second suggestion is more topical and more ephemeral, but therefore also more urgent, if it is to be acted upon at all. I suggest that the institutions represented here should cooperate in doing some preparatory work for the World Disarmament Conference which is to meet early next year. Twelve years' experience of political cooperation between governments has taught our statesmen that, if an international conference is to be a success, it is essential that there should be adequate *diplomatic* preparation. That is now a commonplace. But is *diplomatic* preparation the only kind of preparation that is needed in an age when diplomatists do so much of their work in the full light of publicity—an age when private people, in ever greater numbers, are following, with ever closer interest, the course of international politics, because they have come to realise that this is their intimate concern: that in the statesmen's work the peoples' lives and fortunes and happiness are at stake? Surely, nowadays, mere *diplomatic* preparation, essential though it is, is not enough by itself. It needs to be supplemented by some corresponding preparation of public opinion. And here, I submit, is a task which our institutions, working in cooperation with one another, are eminently qualified to perform. We are private institutions with varied memberships; and our members include at any rate a large proportion of those persons by whom, in every country, public opinion is formed: the journalists, the business men, the professors, the bankers, the international lawyers, and, in their private capacities, the military and naval officers and the civil servants.

Here, ready for immediate use, we have a most effective means for informing the public in each of our countries, in a scientific, objective, dispassionate way, of what the public in the other

countries is feeling and thinking. Let us make use of these means in order to prepare public opinion for the next great international conference that lies ahead. Without exaggeration, it may be said that the World Disarmament Conference will be the most important gathering of its kind since the Peace Conference of Paris. We are perhaps on the eve of the greatest crisis in international politics since the peace settlement after the World War—a crisis which cannot fail to alter the international situation profoundly either for better or for worse. Let us do what we can, within our own province, to make sure that the effect of the Conference shall be not for the worse but for the better.

My suggestion is this: during the months immediately preceding the date on which the Conference is to meet, let us organise an interchange of speakers. Let each of our national institutions which feels inclined to cooperate in this enterprise invite other national institutions to choose and send representatives who will address the enlightened and influential audience which each of our institutions is able to convene in its own country. The task of such speakers, as I conceive it, would be not political advocacy but scientific exposition. They should regard it as their mission, not to argue for or against the reduction of armaments and not to justify the policy of their own country by contrast with the policy of other countries, but to give, to the foreign audience which they will have the opportunity to address, an accurate and impartial and authoritative exposition of what public opinion in their own country is thinking and feeling about disarmament, and why it is thinking and feeling as it does. The need of the hour is to enable the public in each country to understand their neighbours' point of view. Understanding, of course, does not necessarily bring agreement in its train but it does take the sting out of disagreement. People who really understand one another can disagree without rancour; people who disagree without rancour can discuss their differences with frankness; and a frank discussion of differences is a sovereign means of arriving at an agreement in the end.

Here, then, is the second of the two suggestions with which I conclude this address. I would only add two things. If the Conference decides to take this second suggestion up, it is essential that we should act quickly. The time is short. The exchange of speakers, if it is to be effective, ought to begin as early as possible in the autumn. The second thing which I have to add is this: it is hardly possible or necessary that every institution here represented should arrange an exchange of speakers with every other. The exchanges that are particularly desirable are exchanges between those countries which appear to have the least understanding of one another's point of view at the present time.

## II. H.G. Wells (Fabian Society)

H.G. Wells was a popular novelist—that is, a writer of fiction. His fiction included what one might call the anecdotal novel, and novels of fantasy and prophecy. He also wrote *An Outline of History*.

In 1931, the year of Toynbee's Address, he wrote an article prophesying the state of the world fifty years ahead—1981. It is possible that, as a Fabian Socialist, he attended the Copenhagen Address—or at least read the Address when published. Whatever the case, Wells's 1931 'prophecy' reflects the *intent* underlying Toynbee's forecasts. The theme and the intent are the abolition of national sovereignty and the establishment of a fully-armed World Government lording it over human society "as a whole".

In this context it is as well to recall the Fabian-associated Political and Economic Planning group (P.E.P.)'s statement that "Only in war or under threat of war would any British government embark on large-scale planning". We had the war, and got the planning. And the planning has led to loss of national sovereignty—and continued threat of war, perhaps to



be terminated by Toynbee's "knock-out blow" following which "all local sovereign states *except one* are doomed to forfeit their very existence". Paraphrased, that means that one local national sovereign state will rule "human society as a whole" — what is left of it. Note particularly that that prophecy was made in 1931 and that Toynbee was an officer of the Foreign Office in the war years 1943-46.

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### A 1931 PROPHECY

By H.G. WELLS

What, I have been asked, will our world be like in 50 years' time? The question is as attractive as it is absurd. Myriads of unpredictable things may occur to thrust events in this direction or that. It is a much more difficult question to answer now, in 1931, than it would have been 50 years ago, because it is plain we are living in less steadfast times.

Fifty years ago the world was divided among firmly established and stable governments sustained by powerful traditions; the system of mechanical developments which formed the substance of Progress went on steadfastly; it was easy to foretell automobile, aeroplane, the abolition of distance, the concentration at the centre of great cities, and the diffusion of suburbs. Radio was already working in the laboratories. Its appearance on the street was only a question of time.

The recovery of the United States was plainly going on — the growth of a mighty Great Power on the new railway net between Atlantic and Pacific, and the industrialisation of the North and East. The dividing up and struggle for Africa was obviously coming. The Franco-German *revanche* or a counter-attack was as manifest a certainty. There was nothing to stop the merry game of armament, and so the War in the Air also was inevitable.

Prophecy was indeed an easy game in those days. A writer had to be blind to the obvious if he did not score a fairly high percentage of hits.

But things are not like that today. Instead of progress there is crisis everywhere. There is no government, not even the American, which has now the manifest fixity of the "Great Powers" of the 1880s. There is a growing scepticism whether any existing government is as necessary as it ought to be. All contemporary governments have been outgrown — physically and mentally — by the needs of mankind. The abolition of distance, foretold 50 years ago, is achieved. That has made all the governments in the world misfits. Seventy-odd sovereign governments, all acting independently and competitively, all jammed together by that abolition of distance, are trying to carry on the affairs of our race, which now, under the new conditions, would be far more conveniently and successfully dealt with as one world business. Human life has become a world-wide thing, but governments remain cramped and partial things.

More and more people are coming to realise this. Yet none of us knows clearly how to change over to a more comprehensive and securer way of running the world.

While we puzzle over the riddle, armaments go on, and the old — and now utterly stupid — tradition of malevolence between sovereign governments and their "peoples" is maintained. International politics still consist largely of idiotic attempts on the part of these 70-odd governments amid which our affairs are entangled to get the better of their rivals, to maintain a flaming prosperity within their borders while restricting and injuring the welfare of all other peoples.

The old game goes on because the world lacks the mental energy to call it off. So we are all drifting through needless and wasteful economic war towards actual military war. Some years ago I wrote that the salvaging of civilisation was a race between education and

catastrophe. Nowadays I am forced to add a qualification. Catastrophe indeed travels briskly; tariffs strangle trade; gold — the life blood of trade — is being hoarded against some fresh day of reckoning; armaments increase; the friction between States intensifies. The new air war is being prepared. The new gas war is being prepared. But education has not even started yet. There is no race. It looks like a walk-over for catastrophe.

In the schools of Britain, America, France, Germany, Italy, Japan today the school-teachers are still doing the fundamental work of mental armament. There are few exceptions. And the hundreds of millions of "modern democracy" show as much ability to protect their minds from subjugation and arrest the advancing disaster, which will enslave, torture, mutilate, and destroy the greater proportion of them, as a trainload of hogs bound for Chicago.

Gladly would the prophet prophesy pleasant things. But his duty is to tell what he sees. He sees a world still firmly controlled by soldiers, patriots, usurers, and financial adventurers; a world surrendered to suspicion and hatred, losing what is left of its private liberties very rapidly, blundering toward bitter class conflicts, and preparing for new wars.

The economic machine is stalling in every country in the world. The decline is going on under our eyes. Production is diminishing, trade is declining; presently we shall find even our present educational and hygiene services too costly for our existing methods of payment. Few people realise yet how flimsy are the liberties and securities, the plenty and the leisure, we still enjoy. But it is more probable than not that in 50 years' time men may be less secure, less well fed, and clothed and housed less comfortably than they are today, and that in that retrogressive age it may already have become as difficult and dangerous to travel from San Francisco to London or Paris as it was to go from London to Moscow in the 13th century.

The prophet must say what he sees. It is as if I was watching a dark curtain fall steadily, fold after fold, across the bright spectacle of hope with which the century dawned. The way toward a great world State of power, freedom, and general happiness is still plainly open to mankind. We have been brought to the very borders of the Promised Land of Progress. And the amount of visible human determination to cross those borders and escape from the age-long sequences of quarrelling, futility, insufficiency, wars, and wasted generations that fill the bloodstained pages of history, is — contemptible.

There is no inevitability in the approaching catastrophe. I confess I see no signs whatever of any such awakening as might save us, but who can tell what may be happening among the young, among the intelligent and wilful, outside one's range? It would need nothing superhuman to avert the decline. We are not being beaten in an honorable struggle; we are loitering and rotting down to disaster. A few thousand resolute spirits, the tithe of a tithe of the misdirected heroism that went to waste in the Great War, a few hundred million dollars for a world campaign for the new order, might still turn the destinies of mankind right round toward a new life for our race.

Professor Einstein has said that it needs only 2 per cent of the populations of Europe and America to say plainly that they will resist any war that may be contrived for them, to put an end to the foolery of militarism forever. I agree. I would go further and say 2 per cent in the five leading countries in the world. It needs only that the governments of the United States, Britain, France, Germany and Russia should get together in order to set up an effective control of currency, credit, production, and distribution; that is to say, an effective "dictatorship of prosperity" for the whole world.

The other 60-odd States would have to join in or accommodate themselves to the overruling decisions of these major powers. It is as simple a business as that, which our presidents, potentates, statesmen, kings of finance, and so forth, do not even realise they could carry through. With human decay and disaster plain before them!

They just fumble along. The bands play and we "troop the colors". The party men twaddle about debts and security. They cant patriotism. They love their countries so that they would rather see them starve than let them co-operate with nasty foreigners. They do their best to reassure the world - and do, it seems, succeed in reassuring the world - that this skimped, anxious, dangerous life we lead is the best that can be done for us. These rulers and leaders and statesmen of ours get in front of the cameras at every possible opportunity to put their fatuous selves on record, while Death, the Ultimate Creditor, and Collapse, the Final Stabiliser, add up their inexorable accounts.

But given that wave of sanity, that sudden miraculous resolve to stop this foolery, and what sort of world might we have before another half century has passed?

Everyone alive might be by then a citizen of the whole world. All of us would then be free to go where we would about this fascinating and sometimes so lovely planet, which would have become our own. For most of our life we should be released from toil. All the necessities of the human population - food, abundant transport, clean, fresh, and beautiful housing and furniture, adequate health services, education, social security - could be supplied now under modern conditions by something between 12 and 20 years of not too arduous work on the part of everyone. The town, the countryside would be undergoing constant revision and improvement: the world city would be constantly more gracious and pleasant; the world garden constantly more beautiful. The layout of industry could be as exciting as a game.

These are not the assertions of an "imaginative writer"; they are possibilities proved up to the hilt by economists and by the scientific examination of these matters. Some 15 or 20 years of growth, education, and preparation there would have to be for everyone, and the rest of life would be free for creative work, for graceful living, for movement and experience. There is no need now why the vast majority of us should still be prisoners, kept in this or that narrow country by restrictions upon migration and unable to move because of our poverty and in subjection to this or that form of drudgery that could have been rationalised out of existence years ago.

There is no need why any human being now should be underclad or ill-clad, badly housed or sickly. The whole world could be run as one concern and yield a universal well-being.

And it is no good mincing matters when it comes to saying why we have not this universal well-being at the present time. Most of our rulers and directors are, to put it plainly, narrow-minded, self-centred, mentally indolent, pompous, and pretentious creatures of the past; and we are fools enough to tolerate their mismanagement. These ruling and controlling people have got enough for themselves, they stick to the controls like barnacles, they live in relative comfort engaged in the defence of their own conceit, and the mass of us lacks the spirit, will and understanding to call them to account.

A thousand million human beings are leading lives of want, limitation, humiliation and toil; scores of millions are in immediate danger of the futile tortures of war, and these dull, self-protective folk in control of things do nothing of what they might do and pose for our respect and admiration with infinite self-complacency.

But in another 50 years after that renaissance - if, after all, it should occur - things will be different. For an ignorant world we shall have a soundly educated world, aware of its origins.

Every human being born into that world of plenty will learn from the beginning of the varied loveliness of the life before it, and of the expanding drama of human achievement in which it has to play its part. Its distinctive gifts will be developed. It will be taught another history than that of kings and conquerors and armies. It will do its fair and definite share in the productive or other necessary service of mankind, and for the rest it will be released to accomplish whatever possibilities it has of innovation, happiness, and interesting living.

That wide fine life is within reach of mankind; it is there for the taking. But mankind is not taking it. The curtain is falling. When the Promised Land is cut off forever, *Homo sapiens* will be readily convinced there never was a Promised Land. The last thing we human beings will produce is concerted effort; only under the spur of greed or panic do we produce that. We shake our heads sagely at the "dreamers". As long as possible we will go on living the close, ignoble lives of thieves, bullies, and drudges to which we are accustomed. We will snuffle our satisfaction that we are not in any "fantastic Utopia".

And when presently the rifles are put into our hands again, we shall kill. The whips will be behind us and the "enemy" in front. The Old History will go on because we had not the vigor to accept the new.

• • •

George Orwell in his novel *Nineteen-eighty-four* depicts the world as in being in that year. We, in 1981, await "the knock-out blow" and "the forfeiture of our existence". And maybe in 1991 "society as a whole" will have Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World*: All power to the genetic engineers.

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#### THE BITTER FRUITS OF PROPHECY

The so called 'rich' or 'have' nations comprise less than 20 per cent of the total world population. The propaganda of One World advocates naturally encourages in the 'poor' or 'have not' populations the expectation that their standard of living will comprise all the 'goodies' now enjoyed by the 'rich' - for every family a luxury car colour TV, speedboat, luxury travel - a way of life flaunted internationally by satellite TV.

The universalisation of the "Western" way of life is physically impossible, and the One World promoters know it. The actual One World standard of living, except for the World Governors, will be that exemplified in Communist Russia and China, and accompanied by depopulation as in Kampuchea, Vietnam and Africa (where it is accomplished on the do-it-yourself principle) - to conserve the earth's limited resources for Big Brother and his progeny in the millennia (if any) to come. Guess who?

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#### A REJECTED PROSPECT

It is now well over twenty years since C.H. Douglas commented "We are more than ever, if possible, convinced that a falling price level, without loss to producers and entrepreneurs, is the core of social and industrial pacification. And we are equally convinced by thirty years specialised experience and observation that the coterie at the core of world unrest knows it too, and is determined that at whatever cost, extending to the complete destruction of civilisation, and even of the terrestrial globe, it will not have that solution, which would wrest power from it as nothing else would."

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## “Prophetic Doom”

(Originally published in *The Social Crediter* in Dec. 1971)

James Reston, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), wrote in the *New York Times* of May 21, 1971, that “Nixon would obviously like to preside over the creation of a new world order, and believes he has an opportunity to do so in the last 20 months of his first term”.

Mr. Reston would have been more accurate had he written of the *birth* of a new world order. The *creation* of a new organic form precedes—often by a very long period of time—its *birth* into the world of already manifested creation. The moment of conception is always a mystery. And after this moment, the fact of conception remains hidden for an indefinite period, until its growing maturation brings forth evidence of its ultimate or imminent birth. And thus it is with “a new world order”.

In his *Programme For the Third World War* (Chapter VIII) the late C. H. Douglas pointed out that the existence of the American continent was known in banking circles when it was quite unknown outside them. “If this was so, it is reasonable to assume that when action was taken in regard to this knowledge it was considered action.”

Douglas also drew attention to the design of the Great Seal of the United States, the obverse of which bears the Masonic symbol of World Government, and the inscription “Novus Ordo Seclorum”—“A New World Order”—the designation of President Nixon’s New Economic Policy as of Lenin’s transitional economic policy in Soviet Russia. What was sprung by Lenin on Russia was a system incubated in advance, just as Nixon’s “new” policy was preceded by enabling legislation well in advance of its implementation, now in train (see T.S.C., Oct. 2, 1971).

This is the background to Professor Arnold Toynbee’s statement (see *International Affairs*, Nov. 1931) that “We Europeans have called a new world into being not to *redress* but to *upset* the balance of the old” (original emphasis). Professor Toynbee was for many years Director of the (originally) British, now—since 1926—Royal Institute of International Affairs.

On Nov. 10, 1970, a banquet was held at the Mansion House to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Institute. The speakers on the occasion were Mr. Edward Heath, Prime Minister of (once-Great) Britain, and J. M. A. Luns, Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Heath in common with the Prime Ministers of other Commonwealth countries, is an Honorary President of the Institute; and is also (or was) a Director of Brown Shipley & Co., the London branch of a powerful American financial group and a Corporate Subscriber to the funds of the Institute. In his address, Mr. Heath “recalled how it was decided at a meeting of the British and American delegates to the Peace Conference in Paris in 1919 [Professor Toynbee was a Member of the British team, and Walter Lippman of the American] to found an independent Anglo-American institute for the study of international affairs.

“Later this body was divided [binary fission] into two institutions, the Council on Foreign Affairs in New York and the British (later Royal) Institute of International Affairs, better known as Chatham House. It was essential, said Mr. Heath, that people should know and understand the issues which confronted the Government [which people?]

“The contribution of Chatham House to this task has been outstanding and over the years successive British governments have been deeply indebted to the Institute for all it had achieved.”

—“Successive British governments.” The White Paper, “The United Kingdom and the European Communities”, says: “A decision not to join would be a reversal . . . of the whole direction of British policy under successive governments during the past decade”. Mr. Heath’s remark makes it clear that the ‘direction’ given to the successive governments came from Chatham House. How is it done?

The Annual Report of the Council of the Institute, 1970/71, which reports Mr. Heath, also discloses that “On 7 and 8 May, 1970, a conference on the theme of Europe in 1990, organised by Chatham House and PEP was held at Chatham House to mark the 20th anniversary of the Schumann Plan for a European Coal and Steel Community. . . . The Rt. Hon. George Thomson . . . spoke of the main problems likely to arise in the forthcoming negotiations for British membership of the European Communities—both the technical problems . . . and also the *greater issues of a more united and effective Europe*” (emphasis added).

Again: “At the beginning of November 1970 four representatives from Chatham House together with the Directors of the Institute for Strategic Studies [which has informed the world that Soviet Russia has achieved strategic superiority in Europe], PEP, and the Committee on Invisible Exports and a representative of the National Institute for Economic and Social Research visited Brussels to meet members of the Commission of the European Communities”.

Under the heading: *Chatham House Studies Programme*, the *Report* states: “The study groups and conferences bring together widely differing categories of scholars, officials, businessmen, journalists and others, and the educational character of these groups is to some extent their sufficient justification”. But not the whole extent, of course.

Compare this with the purposes of the CFR: On July 29, 1921, the Council on Foreign Relations was incorporated, to bring together “experts on statecraft, finance, industry, education and science; to *create* and stimulate *international* thought among the people of the United States, and to this end, to cooperate with the Government of the United States and with international agencies . . . to create new bodies, and to employ such other and further means, as from time to time may seem wise and proper” (emphasis added). “Further means” include addresses to selected industrialists by such foreign policy experts as Castro, Mikoyan, Hammarsskjold, Nkrumah, etc.

This is the technique of semi-secret or anonymous ‘background briefing’. Participants in these Chatham House and CFR programmes are informed that they may make use of the information gained at various sessions, but may not attribute their knowledge or opinions formed to Chatham House or the CFR. This procedure inevitably induces a feeling of superiority in the ‘insiders’ as against the ‘outsiders’, and accounts for the pontifical attitude of so many professional political commentators: they are “in the know”. And it accounts also for the international unanimity of comment on international affairs. They follow the ‘Line’ agreed in the inner Councils of Chatham House and the CFR.

Following the ‘binary fission’ of the British Institute,

the Royal Institute has metastasised throughout the Commonwealth, while maintaining an almost symbiotic relationship with its binary product, the CFR; and of course there is a close association with similar organisations in almost every country—they are listed in the Council's Report, together with much other revealing information relating to such matters as finance and sponsorship. Both Chatham House and the CFR are sustained by massive grants from international banking groups and the great tax-free Foundations, such as the Rockefeller, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, which financed the study for the military invasion of Southern Africa. Brown Shipley & Co. Ltd. also subscribes. Both Chatham House and the CFR advocate international socialism, which Brezhnev has assured us is inevitable.

Parallel with, and also supported by financial Foundations and sometimes running joint projects, is the organisation (an offshoot of the Fabian Society) Political and Economic Planning (PEP), frequently mentioned in the Report. Its directorate interlocks with Chatham House, but PEP emphasises economic strategy, and thus is something of a wheel within a wheel—but a highly influential one.

All this is the real background to the attempt to subordinate Britain to 'Europe'—an attempt which has nothing to do with economics *per se*, but a great deal to do with the economics of international cartelisation—the world organised as the province of economic internationalism whose consummation is hindered by local national sovereignties. It is the culmination of what Professor Toynbee described as "a deliberate and sustained and concentrated effort to impose limitations upon the sovereignty and independence of the fifty or sixty local sovereign independent states" (*International Affairs*, Nov. 1931). Moreover, he specified deception as the means to achievement ("All the time we are denying with our lips what we are doing with our hands")—a deception still manifest today ("There is no question of any erosion of national sovereignty"—White Paper).

Now if there is anything left that can save Britain from subordination to Europe, as a major step to eventual Communisation, it is *concentration of all the forces in opposition to 'joining Europe' on the narrow front of the preservation of sovereignty*. The economic issues are phonies—distractions deliberately conceived. A straight-out political union with Europe would never have been tolerated by the British public, and its advocacy *as such* would have been death to any political Party.

The Queen in Parliament embodies the national sovereignty of Britain, the preservation of which is the first duty of any Government. Adhering to the Treaty of Rome abrogates that sovereignty, and the advocacy of that abrogation is an act of treason—a violation of allegiance to the Sovereign. It has been well established that the substantial majority of the British are opposed to 'entry', so that the problem is to make that opposition effective; and the way to do that is to focus it sharply on the only vital issue—*sovereignty*. Of course Britain can survive economically—*if sovereign*. After all, Britain led the world in industrialisation. But with loss of sovereignty, Britain's economic interests can and almost certainly will be subordinated to equalising the world's wealth.

That this is the probability is cunningly canvassed in the *Times's* leading article, Nov. 20, 1971, based on the Rutherford lecture given by Dr. Hugh Montefiore, Bishop of

Kingston upon Thames. The *Times* comments: "Internationally, there would have to be similar restraints on the exercise of national freedom of action. Although as he sees it the 'great debate' went off the rails by failing to 'lead people to an understanding that there is not much more economic growth possible; or if there is, it will lead to later collapse', he detects in the EEC the germ of the kind of surrender of sovereignty that the situation requires. It would be a nice irony if the Common Market, advertised as an association for waxing fat, proved its usefulness as an instrument for abating the rapacity of industrial society.

"No such redirection of the collective energies of men would be possible without a drastic revision of political and social attitudes. . . ."

"Yet before man is broken of his acquisitive attitudes in relation to the material universe, before the new conservationists have better success than the old gossellers have had of imparting a religious frame of mind to man in his political capacity, people will have to be brought to assent to the reality of the prophetic doom awaiting them if they do not mend their ways. . . ."

Russia, China, Eastern Europe, North Vietnam, Cuba, Chile . . . are examples of the "drastic revision" which the *Times*, and Chatham House to which the *Times* subscribes, has in mind and in prospect. It will not be averted, as many seem to think, by future obstructive tactics in the House of Commons. Beyond doubt, there is a well-considered strategy to overcome Parliament. Only if public opinion overrides Parliament to prevent the formal adhesion to the Treaty of Rome will there be a viable British future. The stakes, as Douglas observed long ago, which are being played for "are so high that the players, on one side [Chatham House-CFR-PEP-International Finance-Communist Russia] at least, care no more for the immolation of the peoples of a continent than for the death of a sparrow". And that is being demonstrated day by day in Vietnam, the Indian sub-continent, and Ireland. The immolation is being carried out in those areas because there the heavy industry and major resources which are the stake at issue are not at risk. If Europe, including Britain, can be taken by stratagem rather than by force, the "prophetic doom" can be administered at leisure, as in Russia under Stalin, at the end of Lenin's transitional New Economic Policy.

The British people have been, and are being conned. If the Treaty of Rome is signed, they are doomed to extinction as a nation, and in many cases, as individuals.

This article is available as a booklet price 25p. from Bloomfield Books

## THE SOCIAL CREDITER

FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REALISM

This journal expresses and supports the policy of the Social Credit Secretariat, which was founded in 1933 by Clifford Hugh Douglas.

The Social Credit Secretariat is a non-party, non-class organisation neither connected with nor supporting any political party, Social Credit or otherwise.

SUBSCRIPTION RATES: Home and abroad, post free. One year £3.00.

OFFICES:—Business: K.R.P. Publications Ltd., 26 Meadow Lane, Sudbury, Suffolk CO10 6TD. Tel. Sudbury 76374 (STD Code 0787).

Editorial: Penrhyn Lodge, 2 Park Village East, London NW1 7PX. Tel. 01-387 3893.

In Australia (Editorial Head Office): 11 Robertson Road, North Curl Curl, N.S.W. 2099.

THE SOCIAL CREDIT SECRETARIAT

Personnel—Chairman: Dr. B. W. Monahan, 4 Torres Street, Red Hill, Canberra, Australia 2603. Deputy Chairman: British Isles: Dr. Basil L. Steele, Penrhyn Lodge, 2 Park Village East, London NW1 7PX. Telephone 01-387 3893. General Deputy Chairman and Secretary: H. A. Scouler, 11 Robertson Road, North Curl Curl, N.S.W. 2099.